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Abstract 
 
The  impact  of  firm  value  capture  strategies  on  the  sustainability  of  the  value  creation 
process  as  a  whole  has  been  little  discussed  in  the  literature.  Despite  contributions  by 
leading scholars on issues pertaining to value capture and value creation, moreover, we still 
lack a systematic framework of their determinants. Our purpose in this paper is to propose a 
conceptual framework for value creation and value capture, explore their relationship, and 
discuss  pre-requisites  for  sustainable  system-wide  value  creation.  We  then  derive 
propositions  and  explore  implications  of  our  analysis  on  business  strategy  and  public 
policy.   3 
I.  Introduction  
 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the issue of value capture by firms from their perceived 
value adding organisational advantages. We suggest this to be at the heart of firm strategy, 
yet not adequately explored in the literature. In particular, despite strong interest in the 
topic, old and recent, there exists little systematic discussion on the factors that add value at 
the firm level, strategies for value capture, and their interrelationship. In addition, there is 
little  explicit  discussion  on  the  potential  impact  of  value  capture  strategies  on  the 
sustainability of the value creation process at the aggregate society and even world-wide 
levels.  
 
We attempt to fill these gaps in three stages. First, we provide definitions and a short 
historical account of the debate in economics and strategic management in Section II. Then, 
we have a sense-making Section (III), where we provide a more systematic than hitherto 
available  account  of  factors  that  add  value,  and  strategies  for  value  capture,  their 
interrelationship and the impact of value capture on the sustainability of the system-wide 
value creation. Section IV discusses the co-evolution and co-determination of value capture 
and value creation. Section V, discusses implications for managerial practice and public 
policy, limitations and directions for future research. It also concludes. 
 
II.  Value: Nature, Creation, Capture and ‘Advantages’ 
a. Some Definitional Issues 
‘Value’ is a highly loaded term in social science and (strategic) management. Perhaps, 
surprisingly,  the  term  ‘value  added’  is  much  less  so.  For  example  Kay  defines  ‘value   4 
added’ as ‘the difference between the (comprehensively accounted) value of a firm’s output 
and the (comprehensively accounted) cost of the firm’s inputs’ (Kay 1995: 19). Kay regards 
‘value added’ as ‘the key measure of corporate success’ (Kay 1995: 19, emphasis added).  
 
It is tempting to proceed on the above basis, yet it is potentially disconcerting that the term 
‘value added’ is defined through reference to value, which itself is not defined. This is more 
the norm rather than the exception in the literature. More recently for example Bowman 
and Ambrosini discuss ‘value creation versus value capture’, and address questions such as 
‘what is ‘value’? how is it created? And who captures it?’ (Bowman and Ambrosini 2000: 
1). They provide discussions on what is valuable, and/or the types of value (such as ‘use 
value’ and ‘exchange value’) as well as theories of value (for example the marginal utility 
and  cost  of  production  theories),  but  offer  no  definition  of  ‘value’  as  such.  The  same 
applies for the more recent Special Topic Forum of the Academy of Management Review 
(2007) on ‘value creation and value capture’. In their introduction to the Special Topic 
Forum, Lepak et al. point out that ‘value creation is a central concept in the management 
and organisation literature’ and that value creation is ‘not well understood’ (Lepak et al. 
2007: 180). Lepak et al. suggest that ‘value creation depends on the relative amount of 
value that is subjectively realised by a target user (or buyer) who is the focus of value 
creation’ (Lepak et al. 2007: 182). Having defined value creation’ (Lepak et al. 2007: 182), 
the authors then proceed to discuss the process of value creation and the mechanisms that 
allow the creator of value to capture value. Again, value creation is defined in terms of 
value, but value itself is not defined.  
   5 
Such recent difficulties are not hard to appreciate. The concept of ‘value’ goes at least as 
far back as in the works of ancient Greek philosophers like Aristotle and Xenophon and has 
assumed renewed interest in the works of classical economists such as Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo and Karl Marx, and the ‘marginalist’ revolution of Jevons, Menger and Walras. 
Maurice  Dobb  (1973)  has,  in  our  view,  the  most  authoritative  account  to-date  of  the 
historical evolution of these debates. Their gist lies in that ‘classical economists’ considered 
labour (in Marx’s most developed variant, socially necessary labour of average skill and 
competence) expended in a product as the sole source of ‘value’, (see Brown, 2008, for a  
recent  account  and  defence  of  this  view)  while  the  ‘marginalists’  considered  marginal 
utility as the sole source of ‘value’ (Dobb 1973: 168). Subsequent developments in this 
“neoclassical” tradition refer to the ‘theory of value’, as in effect the theory of price, see 
Robbins (1935), Debreu (1959), Hicks (1939). 
 
No less than Joan Robinson (1964) considered the notion of ‘value’ as ‘one of the great 
metaphysical ideas in economies’, namely ideological propositions of some content and 
use, even indispensability, but outside the realm of science proper (see Dobb 1973: 2). 
 
Despite the current dominance of the marginalist school in economics, following the now 
classic  essay  on  the  Nature  and  Scope  of  Economics  by  Lionell  Robbins  (1935),  , 
mainstream microeconomics and Industrial Organisation (IO) texts are still relying on a 
combination of the cost of production theory and the marginal utility theory, as reflected 
respectively in the use of a cost and a demand schedule.
 (Note, however that a subjective 
interpretation of the cost schedule is possible, in terms of it being, in effect, ‘opportunity   6 
costs’, namely values in terms of their best alternative use. This would establish the internal 
consistency  of  the  subjectivist  approach.  I  am  grateful  to  an  anonymous  reviewer  for 
pointing this out). We will follow the convention of assigning ‘value’ to both theories (like 
does Dobb 1973, for example); but cannot fail to note that we have yet to define the term 
‘value’! 
 
For the remainder of this paper we will define ‘value’ as ‘perceived worthiness’ to a final or 
target user of a product or service. Perceived worthiness can be due to rarity, aesthetic 
appeal,  a  perceived  satisfactory  price  for  what  is  on  offer  (‘value  for  money’),  or  a 
combination of these.  
 
‘Value’  can  be  potential  or  realised  –potential  before  a  monetary  price  has  been  paid, 
realised afterwards. The realisation of value as price raises the issue of consumer awareness 
and the existence of substitute products by competitors – therefore issues of promotion and 
marketing as well as competitive strategy. ‘Perceived worthiness’ can be effected through 
efficiency, effectiveness and innovativeness in the production of a good or service that can 
lead either to decreased cost and price for given characteristics, (‘quality’) or to increased 
differentiation (perceived quality). In this sense ‘value added’ equals ‘value creation’ and is 
the  additional  perceived  worthiness  effected  through  reduced  prices  or  increased 
differentiation.  
On the other hand, value capture, is the appropriation of value created by a unit of analysis 
(consumer, firm, region, nation), or other such units, by such a unit. Like value creation,   7 
value capture requires dealing with the issue of promotion-marketing and competition with 
other units offering competing substitute products/services.  
It is arguable that an analysis of the relationship between value creation and value capture, 
presupposes an appreciation of their determinants. Despite extensive accounts on sources of 
superior efficiency, innovativeness and market power in IO and strategic management and 
the recent resurgence of interest is the topic (see also Research Policy 2006), there exists no 
systematic  account  of  the  determinants  of  value  creation,  value  capture  and  their 
interrelationship. We try to provide such an account in section III. Before, in the next sub-
section, we discuss briefly some classic contributions on the issue of ‘value capture from 
advantages’, which will be of input to our subsequent analysis.  
 
b. Value Capture: An Historical Excursion  
 
In  the  strategy  literature  it  is  sometimes  argued  that  ‘business  is  about  creating  value’ 
(Grant 2005: 39).  
In contrast to the above, one may be forgiven to think that firms are not interested in value 
creation per-se, but rather in value capture. Leaving aside issues of personal ethics or pride, 
for  a  business  firm  in  a  capitalist  economy,  what  counts  is  the  bottom-line,  which  is 
profitability, or rate of return on capital. It is arguable that if a business can achieve this 
purely by means of value appropriation (for example by capturing value created by others), 
as a business firm per-se this should be quite satisfactory. In this context, value creation or 
value added, become critical only to the extent it is necessary for a firm to capture value 
created, or simply extant (such as that of ‘free’ goods, such as air and water). Whether the   8 
capture  of  value  presupposes  the  creation  of  value  is  therefore  a  critical  issue  to  be 
addressed.  
 
In mainstream microeconomics and IO, the possibility of capturing value as ‘rents’ appears 
whenever the existence of monopolistic conditions restricts supply, and therefore given the 
demand  schedule,  it  raises  prices  above  the  ones  just  sufficient  to  cover  average  costs 
(which include a ‘fair’ compensation for all resources of production, to include managers 
and entrepreneurs). Moreover, the concepts of ‘rent capture’ or ‘rent seeking’ have wide 
currency in economics, of the private as well as the public sector, see Krueger (1974) and 
Mueller (1989) for comprehensive accounts. Given the assumption of given technology and 
resources-skills, the IO approach is ideal in showing how value can be captured in the form 
of  monopoly  rents,  without  any  preoccupation  with  value  creation.  Subsequent 
development in IO, such as the models of limit pricing and contestable markets, discuss the 
condition under which such ‘rents in equilibrium’ can be effected, see Baumol (1982), 
Tirole (1988), and Pitelis (2007a) for a recent critical account. These conditions refer to the 
existence or otherwise of barriers to entry and exit (or mobility barriers). The absence of 
barriers to mobility help establish the ‘zero waste’ condition (Baumol 1991) or the ‘zero 
profit’ one (Augier and Teece 2008). For the last mentioned, escaping this ‘zero profit’ 
condition is of essence to business strategy. 
 
The stylised assumptions of mainstream IO are not met in practice. In real life costs and 
demand conditions faced by individual firms may differ, firms may be endowed with, or 
build themselves, different (heterogeneous) skills and capabilities, they can be more or less   9 
efficient,  effective  and innovative  than  their  rivals.  Such differences,  moreover, can  be 
attributed and/or reflected in, not just production costs, but also  transaction costs. For 
example, firms which are more efficient, can capture higher profits than their competitors 
in a sector, even when they charge the average market price, simply because they have 
lower  costs;  this  is  Harold  Demsetz’s  (1973)  well  known  ‘differential  efficiency’ 
hypothesis. Similar considerations apply to Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942) idea that  more 
innovative firms will tend to grow bigger and more profitable, with profitability being due 
to superior innovative capability and the temporary monopoly positions that innovations 
can afford to firms. Pitelis (1991) termed this as the ‘differential innovation’ hypothesis. 
Demsetz is a variant of the Schumpeterian view.  
 
Another  possibility  for  different  cost  conditions  between  competitive  and  monopolistic 
firms is discussed in Williamson’s (1968) well known ‘trade-off’, the idea that larger firms 
resulting from a merger, may face lower cost conditions, for example because of synergies 
experienced,  leading to an ‘efficiency’ benefit, that should be traded-off against the static 
allocative welfare loss of monopoly power, see Scherer and Ross (1990) for discussion. 
The  resurfacing  of  Coase’s  (1937)    transaction  costs  analysis,  and  the  subsequent 
elaborations and extensions by Williamson (1975, 1985) and others, offer another reason 
why large size and the concomitant more concentrated industry structures, can be seen as 
the outcome of firms capability in reducing market transaction costs through superseding 
the market – therefore through integration (or internalisation). 
   10 
More  recently  the  resource-based-view  (RBV)  provided  extensive  discussions  as to  the 
reasons for firm heterogeneity (see Teece, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993), Foss (1993), and Mahoney (2005) for a critical account. There are arguably two but 
related variants of RBV - the ‘rents in equilibrium’ and the ‘value creation’ one, see Foss 
(1999).  The former can be seen as a variant of the IO literature on barriers to entry, only 
now  the  reason  for  monopoly  rents  is  the  possession  by  firms  of  resources  which  are 
valuable, rare, and non-imitable. The ‘value-creation’ variant focuses more on the resource-
creation  potential  of  firms,  through  (endogenous)  knowledge  creation,  innovation  and 
growth (Penrose, 1959).  
 
Building on Penrose (1959), George Richardson (1972) provided an additional production-
based reason for the division of labour between markets, firms, (integration) and inter-firm 
cooperation, based on the ideas of similarity and complementarity of activities. Similar 
activities are those which require the same or closely related capabilities. Similarity with 
complementarity  suggests  integration,  dissimilarity  suggests  market,  and  dissimilarity 
combined with complementarity suggests inter-firm cooperation – see Kay (1998) and Foss 
and Loasby (1998) for critical assessments.  
 
The  aforementioned  analysis  focused  on  the  cost  (or  supply)-side,  but  there  is  also  a 
demand one. Like facing (or effecting) different cost curves, firms can also face (or effect) 
different  demand  conditions.  There  is  an  extensive  literature  in  IO  about  the  role  of 
advertising  and  other  promotion  activities  by  firms  that  aim  to  change  the  demand 
conditions, by creating new demand and/or by making the demand schedule they face less   11 
elastic, see Scherer and Ross (1990) for discussions. Scholars, such as Kenneth Galbraith 
(1967) went as far as suggesting that the ability and effectiveness of firms to create demand 
is such that one should be talking about ‘producer sovereignty’ not consumer one. Cowling 
(1982, 2006)  provides an extensive account of the role of advertising in today’s micro- and 
macroeconomy.  The  very  focus  of  the  ‘marketing’  literature  is  arguably  to  explore 
conditions under which consumers will be more inclined to buy, see Adner and Zemsky 
(2006). Priem emphasizes firm ability to create value, by engendering ‘consumer benefits 
experienced’ (Priem 2007: 219). 
 
Despite such interest on value, value added-creation and value capture, by leading scholars, 
the  specific  link  between  value  capture  and  firm  advantages,  was  first  introduced  by 
Stephen Hymer (1960/1976). Hymer’s now famous PhD thesis at MIT explained the choice 
of modality of foreign operations by firms, (for example foreign direct investment -fdi- 
versus licensing), in terms of the superiority of some modalities like fdi is allowing firms to 
capture value from their ‘advantages’. Hymer’s ‘advantages’ thesis was a unique insight he 
developed  by  drawing on  Jo  Bain’s  (1956) earlier  observation that  the barriers to  new 
competition, that Bain discussed in his book, were due to underlying firm advantages see 
Dunning and Pitelis (2008) for a recent account. Hymer’s ‘advantages’ thesis was applied 
to the case of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and fdi, and helped establish him as the 
father-figure of the field of International Business. In this context, it is not surprising that 
further contributions in the advantages tradition were made by IB scholars, such as John 
Dunning (1988, 2000).  
   12 
Hymer himself focused on ‘monopolistic advantages’, not efficiency advantages, thereby 
avoiding carefully to assign any value-creating attributes to such advantages. Subsequent 
work in IB, not least Buckley and Casson (1976) and Dunning’s envelope (the Ownership, 
Location, Internalisation-OLI, paradigm), focused on efficiency (value adding) advantages 
deriving from reductions in transaction costs (Buckley and Casson, 1976), or efficiency and 
monopolistic advantages (Dunning, 1988, 2000).  
 
Outside  IB,  David  Teece  (1986)  (who  had  himself  made  very  significant  earlier 
contributions in IB scholarship, to include his work on Hymer, see Teece, 1985), made a 
landmark contribution, by exploring conditions under which an innovator (such as EMI), 
would  fail  to  profit  from  its  innovations.  He  attributed  such  failures  to  the  lack  of 
complementary skills and capabilities vis-à-vis competitors. While Teece did not use the 
term value capture from value creating advantages, his ‘profiting from innovation’ theme, 
is very much in line with the ‘capturing value from value creating advantages’ idea; as he 
deals explicitly both with value capture  and ‘innovation’, one of firm advantages most 
widely regarded as value adding or creating (see Dunning and Pitelis, 2008). More recent 
works by Teece  himself (Teece, 2006), and in Research Policy (2006) both revisiting 
Teece (1986), are in fact more explicitly couched in ‘value capture from value creating 
advantages’ terms – our theme here. 
 
Despite significant progress, we claim below that there exists no unifying, systematic and 
discriminating  account  of  the  determinants  of  value  creation,  value  capture  and  their 
interrelationship,  that  helps  ‘make  sense’  of  the  various  contributions.  In  addition,  the   13 
impact of system-wide value capture on the sustainability of value creation has not been 
given  attention.  We start with ‘sense making’ in the next Section.  
 
III.  ‘Sense-Making’:  Determinants  of  Value  Creation  and  Firm  Value  Capture 
Strategies 
 
There exists a very extensive literature that discusses efficiency (allocative or dynamic 
through innovation) and market power in economics, and strategic management –or what 
Williamson  (1991)  calls  ‘Economising  versus  Strategising’,  see  Mahoney  (2005)  for  a 
discussion. All such literature is of import to our discussion of value creation and value 
capture; so we will therefore need to be eclectic. We start with the determinants of value 
creation.  
 
a.  The Determinants of Value Creation by Firms.  
 
Besides ‘innovation’ (the focus of Teece, 1986), and many before and since (see Research 
Policy , 2006), Fagerberg et al (2005), we claim in this sub-section that three additional 
factors  are  critical  determinants  of  value  added  at  the  firm  level  -  human  (and  other) 
resources, unit costs economies-increasing returns, and firm infra-structure and strategy. 
All these derive from extant literature, but have not hitherto been presented in a unifying 
context. In addition, we claim that these four factors are generic or fundamental-first-order-
determinants.  Other  factors  discussed  in  the  literature,  (for  example  networks),  operate 
through the four first-order factors, see below.    14 
 
As far back as in Adam Smith’s (1776) ‘pin factory’ the benefits from intrafirm division of 
labour,  teamwork  and  ‘inventions’  by  labourers,  itself  engendered  through  learning  by 
doing, were viewed by Smith as critical determinants of  productivity and wealth creation 
(Smith, 1776, Chapter 1), see Loasby (1996). Marshall (1920) extended Smith’s analysis by 
identifying knowledge as ‘our most powerful engine of production’ (Marshall 1920: 138, 
quoted  by  Loasby  1998:  164).  Schumpeter’s  (1942)  focus  on  competition  as  ‘creative 
destruction’ through innovations, is arguably the main dynamic value creation theory of 
innovation, see Amitt and Zott (2001). The Schumpeterian view of innovation was adopted 
by Penrose (1959), one of the founders of the resource-based view (RBV), and the dynamic 
capabilities view, see Mahoney (2005), for a critical survey. The value creation  version of 
the RBV, by for example Penrose (1959), Teece ( 1986), Teece et al. (1997), Teece (2007), 
Helfat et al (2007), focuses on value creation through efficiency-innovation. 
 
The focus on (endogenous) growth through knowledge creation and innovations in Penrose 
and  the  value  creation  version  of  the  RBV,  complement  Schumpeter’s  analysis.  The 
implication  of  the  last  mentioned  on  intertemporal  (dynamic)  efficiency  is  now 
acknowledged by mainstream IO economists too, see for example Baumol, (1991, 2002). 
 
In  the  traditional  neoclassical  theory  of  growth  (for  example  Solow,  1956),  existing 
technology is considered to be embodied in the production function (which includes capital 
and labour), while technological change is seen as exogenous. New  ‘endogenous growth’ 
theories,  recognize  the  potential  endogenous  nature  of  technology  and  innovation,  the   15 
possibility of increasing returns to scale and the significance of human resources such as 
management, in engendering growth, see Lucas (1988), Romer (1986, 1990) and Aghion 
and Durlaf (2005), who also discuss more recent developments. In a way, and without 
always noticing it, such models build on the ideas of Penrose (1959) and Teece (1982, 
1986), in addition of course to earlier contributions by Adam Smith (1776), Allyn Young 
(1928), Kenneth Arrow (1962) and Nicholas Kaldor (1970, 1972) on ‘learning by doing’, 
‘increasing returns’ and the importance of ‘human resources’, notably management, see de 
la Mothe and Paquet (1996), Loasby (1998), Fagerberg et al (2005) and Research Policy 
(2006) for discussions.  
  
 
Despite various limitations of old and new neoclassical growth theory, see Solow (1997), 
Romer (1990), Loasby (1998), its focus on ‘returns to scale’, resources (capital and labour), 
and (its various assumptions about) technology, provide useful hints on the sources of value 
creation, through cost reduction, differentiation, or a combination of the two. Starting from 
resources, in particular human ones, these have a prominent role in classical economics and 
in management. In Adam Smith, it is labourers who engender productivity enhancement  
through specialisation, division or labour, teamwork learning by doing and inventions. The 
‘capitalist’ in Karl Marx (1959) is the driving force of economic change, the ‘entrepreneur’, 
and  entrepreneurship,  in  Schumpeter  (1942)  and  in  ‘Austrian  Economics’;  see  Ricketts 
(2002) for a critical assessment, as well as in the recent literature on entrepreneurship, see 
for  example  Verbeke  and  Yuan  (2007)  for  an  account.  In  Penrose  (1959)  instead,  the 
‘manager’ is the main hero, see Pitelis (2002)) for discussions. The work of scholars such   16 
as Pfeffer (1998) points to the importance of human resources in organisations. In all, the 
quantity,  quality  and  relationships  (for  example  harmonious  or  conflictual)  of  human 
resources  is  of  essence  in  determining  the  ability  of  a  firm  to  create  value  through 
productivity and differentiation, even in influencing the objective of firms (see Cyert and 
March, 1963, Pitelis, 2007). Like firms, human resources are highly unique and individual 
and  their  combination  and  relationships  help  create  the  unique  ‘personality’  of  the 
organization, see Richardson (1998). Non-human resources, are critical in the resource-
based view (RBV) of the firm; see Mahoney (2005) for a critical survey. They have already 
received substantial attention, in the literature, so they need no further elaboration here; see 
however Teece (2007) for a recent account. 
 
‘Returns to scale’/‘increasing returns’, are a major determinant of productivity and value 
creation, see Loasby (1998). Economists, economic historians and management scholars 
focused on numerous factors that lead to reductions in unit costs (unit costs economies 
thereafter). These include economies of scale and scope (Chandler 1962), economies of 
growth  (Penrose  1959),  transaction  costs  economies  (Coase  1937;  Williamson  1975), 
economies of learning (Arrow 1962), economies of joint governance (Williamson 2005) 
external and agglomeration economies (Kaldor 1970; Krugman 1991, 1996; Porter 1980; 
Henderson  2005),  economies  of  pluralism  and  diversity,  Pitelis  (2004).  The  stronger  a 
firm’s unit cost economies are, the lower will tend to be its unit costs, and the higher its 
ability to create value. 
   17 
Missing from economics, but central to business strategy is the other major determinant of 
value creation-firm’s infra-structure and strategy. By firm infra-structure we refer to its 
systems, routines and decision making processes, while by structure we refer mainly to its 
internal organisational form (for example, U-form, M-form, heterarchy, etc.). We adopt the 
conventional definition of strategy, as the pursuit of a long-term objective supported by the 
requisite  allocation  of  human  and  other  resources  for  its  implementation,  see  Chandler 
(1962). The role of firm infra-structure is emphasized in the strategic management literature 
see, for example, Grant (2005). The common focus on the value capture/profiting from 
advantages aspect of strategy, underplays the idea that strategy is of essence in increasing 
efficiency  and  productivity  too,  by  reducing  transaction  and  production  costs  and  by 
increasing  perceived  value  by  effecting  product  differentiation  –  it  is,  therefore,  an 
important determinant of value creation. The role of a firm’s systems, routines and internal 
decision  making  processes  in  value  creation  and  capture,  has  been  explored  by  Simon 
(1995), the RBV, Nelson and Winter (1982, 2002) and Cyert and March (1963); see also 
Loasby (1998), Kay (2000) and Pitelis (2007). The importance of internal organisational 
forms  is  discussed  by  Chandler  (1962),  Hedlund  (1986),  Williamson  (1981)  and 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998). The choice of a firm’s internal structure is of essence in 
carrying out a strategy, increasing efficiency and productivity, acquiring and upgrading 
knowledge and (thus) adding value.  
 
Other potentially value-creating factors considered in the literature include physical and 
financial capital. (Physical capital, for example, is important in the neoclassical growth 
theory  of,  for  example,  Solow,  (1956).  While  both  physical  and  financial  capital  can   18 
contribute to value creation, their contribution is arguably through other variables, notably 
technology, unit cost economies and especially human resources, see Harcourt and Cohen 
(2003), namely it is not independent of the other determinants. Similarly, other resources 
for  example  raw  materials,  serve  as  a  basis  on  which  value  is  added  but  they  are  not 
independent  determinants  of  value  creation,  see  also  Bowman  and  Ambrosini  (2000); 
Brown (2008). 
 
In all, firm infra-structure and strategy, help to both reduce costs, but also effect a firm’s 
unique personality and character, often encapsulated in the complex interactions of tacit 
and codified knowledge, embodied in its business model, see Chesbourgh and Rosenbloom 
(2002). These engender ‘firm differentiation’ and can add perceived value to the consumers 
for example through ‘branding’. 
 
The  determinants  of  value  creation  interact  in  numerous  ways.  For  example,  human 
resources are the source of firms’ innovation, as discussed above. (Smith 1776; Schumpeter 
1942;  Penrose  1959)  and  strategy  (Chandler  1962;  Penrose  1959).  Technology  and 
Innovation impact on unit cost economies (Chandler 1962; Penrose 1959). Innovation and 
technological accumulation can be an explicit element of strategy (Cantwell 1989). Firm 
infra-structure is a crucial prerequisite for the implementation of strategy, the leveraging of 
human resources and technology, (Cyert and March 1963; Nelson and Winter 1982; Loasby 
1998). Unit cost economies, are crucial in enabling innovation the leveraging of human 
resources the undertaking of R&D and innovation. (Chandler 1962) 
   19 
From  the  first-order  determinants,  unit  cost  economies  affect  mainly  the  cost  side.  All 
others, can impact on both cost and utility. For example a process innovation can reduce 
unit  costs  and  engender  product  differentiation.  Infra-structure  and  strategy  can  reduce 
costs  (for  example  through  integration)  and  differentiate  the  firm  itself  (e.g.  through 
branding). Human resources can also affect subjective utility, but mainly through strategy, 
product  differentiation  and/or  innovation.  The  same  is  true  for  unit  cost  economies.  
‘Subjective utility’ and cost reductions in their turn, can feed-back to the four determinants. 
For example, a firms ‘brand’ can help it receive better terms  for advertising and from 
suppliers, thus engender unit cost economies.  
 
As we have pointed out, the aforementioned contributions have direct implications on value 
creation,  albeit  they  are  not  normally  couched  in  such  terms.  More  recently,  however, 
attempts  have  been  made  to  discuss  explicitly  determinants  of  value  creation,  see  for 
example, Amit and Zott (2001), AMR (2007). Some early literature that looks at value 
creation is summarized by Amit and Zott (2001). The authors focus on ‘virtual markets’, 
‘value chains’, ‘(Schumpeterian) innovation’, intra-firm resources, strategic networks and 
transactions costs economics. More recently, Lepak et al (2007) summarize the main points 
of a Special Topic Forum of AMR (2007) on ‘Value Creation and Value Capture’. At the 
organizational  level,  they  emphasize  invention  and  innovation,  management  and 
entrepreneurship,  ‘the  creation  of  new  advantages’  (AMR  2007:  184),  and  factors 
underlying  such  creation,  to  include  managerial  capabilities  and  cognition,  knowledge 
creation,  learning  and  entrepreneurship,  social  networks  and  strategic  human  resources. 
While all these factors are in line with our discussion, it is arguable that they could benefit   20 
from  more  systematization.  For  example,  their  list  includes  generic  factors,  such  as 
innovation, and factors such as  transaction costs, which is just one of many potentially cost 
reducing factors. It also includes strategic networks, which could be seen as a strategic tool 
or  vehicle,  but  not  a  generic  factor,  such  as  strategy.  Given  the  above,  we  consider  it 
important  to  focus  on  the  generic  and  more  general  categories-determinants  of  value 
creation, which we submit to be the ones we discussed. Our discussion is summarized in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Four generic, first-order determinants of value creation 
 
 
•  Figure 1, summarizes four generic, first-order, direct and interacting determinants of 
value creation at the level of the firm 
-  The four determinants are derived from an integration and extension of economics, 
IO and (strategic) management literature 
-  Other factors or subfactors can affect value creation , through their effect on the 
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Our analysis points to the following: 
Proposition 1 
The ability of firms to create value depends  on four generic, first-order factors – unit costs 
economies/increasing returns, human and other resources,  technology and innovativeness, 
and firm infra-structure and strategy. The four factors affect value creation independently 
and in their interaction.  
 
The major implications following from our analysis, concerning the  ‘capturing value from 
advantages’  perspective  and  other  extant  literature,  are  simple  yet  we  feel  powerful. 
Innovation is crucial, yet it is not the only way through which a firm can create value from 
which to profit. The existence of skills capabilities and competences of its human resources 
and the mere existence of perceived advantages, including the conception of a strategy that 
can create value (even from someone else’s innovations) can be sufficient conditions for a 
firm to seek to secure profits from such advantages.  Innovation is neither a sufficient, not a 
necessary condition for firm’s pursuit of value capture. For firms, profiting from innovation 
is a very important subject of a more general theme, that of capturing value from value 
creating form specific advantages. This is important, not least because our analysis remain 
relevant even when there exist markets for technology (see Arora et al. 2001; Chesbrough 
2003) which do not necessitate the use of internalisation in order for firms to profit from 
innovation.  
 
b. Firm Strategies for Value Capture   23 
Capturing value from ‘advantages’, is the concern of any innovator, and more widely a 
major objective of firms (see Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995; Teece et al. 1997), but 
also individuals and nations, see Teece (1986), Porter (1990), Krugman (1996), Wignaraja 
(2003) . Assuming that a firm has produced a useful, innovative product, the fundamental 
question becomes how to obtain the maximum possible net present value (NPV) of the 
anticipated future income streams of this innovation. In addition, the firm, innovator or not, 
has the wider consideration of how to capture the maximum possible value created by 
itself, but also by other firms. This is of essence to competition. Through efficiency, power, 
strategy,  ingenuity,  imagination  and  luck,  firms  need  to  out-compete  rivals  in  order  to 
capture value. In general, firms can capture less, equal or more value than the one  created 
through their activities (see Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995). The size of the pie captured 
by a firm  depends on factors such as their market power, for example, enabled through 
structural  and  strategic  barriers  to  entry,  as  in  Bain  (1956)  and  Porter  (1980).  It  also 
depends  on  the  ability  of  a  firm  to  engender  differentiation  of  the  firm,  vis-à-vis  its 
competitors,  see  below.  In  addition  to  these  determinants  of  value  capture,  ‘generic 
strategies’ (as in Porter 1985) and integration, diversification and inter-firm cooperation 
strategies can be leveraged to capture value.  
 
The literature in barriers to entry goes back Bain (1956). Bain identified three main barriers 
to entry of new firms, which allow incumbents to capture super-normal profits, by keeping 
prices  above  the  competitive  levels  (where  price  equals  average  costs);  absolute  cost 
advantages, economies of scale and product differentiation. His empirical work showed that 
the  last  mentioned  (or  “preference  barrier”)  was  most  important.  Subsequent  literature    24 
focused on pricing (e.g. the limit pricing model, (Modigliani, 1958), investments in excess 
capacity (Spence 1977) product proliferation, and advertising, (see Porter 1980; Scherer 
and Ross 1990). The main characteristic of such barriers is that they focus on the industry, 
not the firm. In contrast, the resource-based view (RBV) focuses on intra-firm rare and hard 
to imitate resources, that are difficult for competitors to copy, thus engendering intra-firm 
barriers to entry, see Peteraf (1993) and Mahoney (2005). Edith Penrose (1959), one of the 
founders of the RBV, discussed both Bain-type barriers to entry, as well as ‘relatively 
impregnable bases’, (Penrose, 1959, p.137 and below). Hard to imitate intra-firm resources 
and capabilities, as well as ‘relatively impregnable bases’ and the overall ‘business model’ 
(Chesbourgh and Rosenbloom 2002), help create a firm’s “distinct identity” (Richardson 
1998), therefore they can be taken to constitute a new genre of barriers to entry, that we call 
‘firm differentiation’.  
 
‘Generic  strategies’  are  well  rehearsed  in  the  literature.  Besides  cost  leadership, 
differentiation  and  focus  (Porter  1985),  they  include  a  ‘value  for  money’  strategy  that 
synthesizes the two, for example in the context of hyper-competition, Pitelis and Taylor 
(1999). ‘Generic’ strategies allow firms to position themselves in a sector, so as to capture 
value by reducing the forces of competition (Bain 1956; Hymer 1960/1976; Porter 1980). 
Integration, diversification and cooperation strategies are also extensively discussed, and 
are the focus of Coase, Hymer, Chandler, Williamson, Teece and Penrose. They aim to 
capture value, either through efficiency, (for example in the transaction costs literature) or 
through market power (for example in Bain, Hymer and Porter). 
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The four types of value capture strategies interact. For example, it is interesting to note that 
Bain’s three barriers include Porter’s two generic strategies. Integration, cooperation and 
diversification are often viewed as barriers to entry (Porter 1980), and they impact on ‘firm 
differentiation’ as they help determine a firm’s ‘business model’-distinct identity.  
 
In their interactions, the four types of strategies for value capture, are also linked to value 
creation. For example, both Bain’s three barriers and Porter’s two generic strategies help 
reduce  unit  costs  and/or increase perceived  value,  so they  help  create  value. Intra-firm 
barriers, ‘impregnable bases’ and the ‘business model’ help firms create perceived value 
through ‘branding’ and by providing an incentive to innovate, Schumpeter (1942), Penrose 
(1959), Baumol, (1991, 2002). Even Bain-type barriers can help create value by providing 
an incentive for entrants and Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’. There follows: 
 
Proposition 2 
Four fundamental and partially overlapping types of strategies – (strategic) entry difference, 
‘firm differentiation’, ‘generic strategies’ and integration, diversification and cooperation 
strategies,  determine,  independently  and  in  their  interaction,  the  ability  of  firms  to 
profit/capture value from their value creating advantages.  
 
An implication from our analysis is that even innovation in the conventional sense is not 
necessary for value capture. For example, firms like IBM, Microsoft, Cisco, Intel, Sun and 
Oracle  can  capture  value  through  strategy  without  any  new  innovation  advantages 
(Chesbourgh 2003). Looked differently, they are innovative in devising strategies for value   26 
capture. Importantly, moreover, technology and innovation themselves can be seen as part 
and  parcel  of  a  value  capture  strategy.  The  possibility  of  capturing  value  from  the 
innovation of others brings centre-stage the issue of competition. In general, total value 
created is the sum total of all firms’ (as well as others) value adding activities. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2, as the total area within the circle (A). The inner circle constitutes the 
value created by firm i. The value captured by firm i, however,(represented by the dotted 
lined circles), can be larger, or smaller than the value it created (see Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff 1995). This will depend on its ability to device and implement a portfolio of value 
capture  strategies  superior  to  that  of  its  competitors.  The  sustainability  of  a  firm’s 
competitive advantage over time will depend on its ability to keep abreast of rivals in terms 
of  capturing  value  created  by  itself  and/or  other  firms.  Innovation  is  useful,  but  not 
necessary in this context (except if it is conceived more broadly, to include all types of 
innovations, such as organizational and strategy-related). In addition, while strategy may 
suffice to capture value, it can also help create value.  
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
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Figure 2 – Four major genres of strategies for value capture 
 
•  Four major genres of strategies affect value capture; (strategic) entry deterrence,  
‘generic’ strategies, integration, diversification and cooperation strategies and “firm 
differentiation” strategies. 
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Through  requisite  value  capture  and  value  creation  strategies,  firms  aim  to  achieve 
sustainable  competitive  advantage  (SCA),  see  Teece  (2007).  Allowing  for  strategies  to 
capture  and  create  value,  renders  strategy  itself  an  ‘advantage’  from  which  firms  can 
capture value. The complex interaction between value creation and value capture can help 
firms to try to create SCAs. 
 
c. Value Capture and the Sustainability of System-wide Value Creation 
Our  focus  so  far,  and    the  almost  exclusive  focus  of  strategy  management,  is  on  the 
Sustainable  Competitive  Advantage  (SCA)  of  firms,  see    Teece  (2007)  for  a  recent 
restatement. However, the way through which firms acquire and sustain SCAs can be of 
importance  to  the  performance  of  the  industry,  the  nation  and  the  world  at  large. 
Accordingly, it could be of importance to the longer-term sustainability of the CA of firms 
too. Put differently, a genuine firm-level SCA should be defined as one that is taking into 
account all the potential intertemporal negative externalities of the firm’s activities. SCA in 
this definition would be equivalent to a firm’s net value added, or, differently put, the Net 
Present Value of its value added throughout its existence, calculated to have internalized all 
potentially negative externalities. Clearly this is not easy to calculate; for one, the problem 
of externalities is far too vexed to allow this, (see Dahlman 1979), and we do not possess 
the requisite knowledge. However, this should not stop us from addressing the problem.  
 
There  is  extensive  literature  on  issues  pertaining  to  our  concern  with  sustainability,  to 
include  ‘conflict,’    ‘agency’,  ‘rent  seeking’  and  issues  of  time-inconsistency.  The 
possibility of divergent interests between economic agents, or groups of them, has been   29 
explored by the likes of Adam Smith, Karl Marx and more recently literature on  ‘agency’, 
the  ‘managerial revolution’, (the alleged separation of ownership and control), and the 
behavioral theory of the firm; see Pitelis (2004, 2007) for relevant accounts. The issue here 
is how is presence of conflicting interests, ‘principals’ can ensure that ‘agents’ will operate 
in ways that further the interests of the principal - how ‘interest alignment’ can be achieved. 
The  ‘agencies’  usually  considered  involve  owners  and  workers  (Alchian  and  Demsetz 
1972) or owners (shareholders) and managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976). For example, a 
solution to the problem of ‘agency’ between shareholders and managers and the alignment 
of their interests can help the firm focus on ‘shareholder value’, and achieve SCA. 
 
There  exist  various  controversies  on  this,  (see  Pitelis  2004  for  an  account),  but  even 
granting a focus on shareholder value and firm SCAs, there are additional ‘agencies’ to be 
considered. These include the firm and the industry, the industry and the nation, the nation 
and the world. In general, what is good for a firm may not be good for the industry, what is 
good for an industry may not be good for the nation, and what is good for one nation may 
not be good for the world as a whole. To appreciate a focus on ‘the world’, for example, all 
one needs to do is ‘imagine’ that the world is ‘flat’, merely fully integrated as a single 
nation, see Friedman (2005) and Ghemawat (2007) for opposed views. In a non-flat world, 
the more commonly expressed view that what is good for a firm or industry may not be 
good for the nation as a whole (see Olson, 1971), becomes directly relevant and applicable 
to the case of what is good for a nation, may not be good for the world, as a whole. 
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The IO literature focuses on monopoly and restrictive practices by firms as actions that may 
undermine the performance of the industry as a whole. The impact of monopolies on social 
welfare has been explored extensively in the IO literature, notably as the Issue of ‘welfare 
losses  of  monopoly’  (see  Scherer  and  Ross  1990).  The  potential  detrimental  effects  of 
‘strategic  trade’  policies  especially  by  developed  nations  on  the  ability  of  developing 
nations to develop and therefore on long-term value creation at the world level, have been 
discussed, notably in the context of the new (or strategic) trade theory, see Krugman (1986, 
1987,  1992).  The  wider  effects  of  ‘rent-seeking’  and  a  rent-seeking  society  have  been 
explored by political economists, see for example Krueger (1974). The general idea is that 
it matters how one achieves ones’ advantages. If these are achieved through rent-seeking 
(for example entrepreneurship that focuses on value capture and value redistribution, not 
value creation), this will tend to undermine intertemporal value creation. 
 
An example on how national interest may undermine global value creation (and therefore in 
the long-term national interest as well) can be the attitude of Western Governments and 
international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank towards the 1997 East 
Asia  Crisis  as  compared  to  the  recent  ‘Credit  Crunch’.  The  advice  to  the  Asian 
governments was to liberalize financial markets and increase interest rates. This led to a 
worsening of the crisis for the countries that followed this advice, in contrast to those who 
did not follow it, (such as India and China), which were least affected. In contrast, during 
the recent ‘credit crunch’ Western Governments such as the US reduced the interest rates 
and bailed-out, even nationalized, companies, such as Northern Rock in the UK, despite the 
‘moral hazard’ problem that this entails. For Stiglitz (2007) this is no less that ‘financial   31 
hypocrisy’, explicitly aimed to serve the interests of a group of people – rich financiers 
mainly from a handful of countries. Such ‘hypocrisy’ and the pursuit of sectional interests 
is a classic case of ‘rent-seeking’ that could undermine intertemporal world-wide value 
creation. 
 
To conclude, firm SCA need not lead to industry SCA, which need not lead to national 
SCA, which need not lead to world-wide sustainable value creation. Much depends on how 
each  agent  tries  and  manages  to  capture  value.  When  they  do  so  through  restrictive  
practices,  and/or  ‘rent-seeking’,  this  may  undermine  overall  world-wide  value  creation, 
leading  to  a  ‘systemic  failure’  that  needs  to  be  addressed.  This  may  also  come  about 
because of factors such as ‘myopia’, mistakes and time inconsistencies. Moreover, ‘system 
failures’ can arise even when there exists interest alignment, see for example Metcalfe 
(2003). For our purposes here, the  above discussion leads to  
 
Proposition 3.  
The  pursuit  of  value  capture,  through  legitimate  and  illegitimate  means,  by  economic 
agents may be insidious to sustainable world-wide value creation. 
 
III. Co-evolution, Co-determination and Learning 
It is said that the essence of a diagram is in its ‘arrows’. If so, our diagrams are of dubious 
usefulness- there exist  too many arrows, mostly bi-directional!  A reason for this apparent 
indeterminacy, however, is simply that the indeterminacy is not apparent – it is quite real! 
While our analysis in the previous section was aimed to be an exercise in “sense making”,   32 
in the real world, economic agents operate in a context of uncertainty, often radical, (the 
one where no probabilities can be assigned on expected future outcomes) – see Knight 
(1921). In such a context, agents cannot hope optimize in the way described in the previous 
section; instead they try to do as best as they can, under the circumstances; for example in 
the case of firms, they aim for the maximum possible profit over time. In so doing, firms 
may actually not go for profit in the short-run but pursue other objectives, such as market 
share and growth. This is because they may believe that by pursuing growth and market 
share they will be in a stronger position to achieve long-term profits (see Best, 1990 for the 
case of Japanese firms), or rather because the very process of growth is endogenous to the 
firm, as argued by Penrose (1959). For Richardson (1998) the presence of uncertainty and 
indeed divergent beliefs about the chance of success among participants is of the essence of 
the competitive process- as it fuels creativity. 
 
Penrose’s approach is helpful in exploring the relationship between value capture and value 
creation in a co-evolutionary setting. In the absence of perfect knowledge, firms can simply 
never be certain whether and how to capture value in a sustainable way. If there was a 
guarantee of monopoly rents, firms might well go for it – but there is none. In such context, 
the best a firm can do is to aim to simultaneously develop advantages and try to capture 
value from them by using the panoply of value creation determinants and value capture 
strategies we discussed in the last section. In the absence of monopoly, such advantages are 
likely to be value creating ones, namely advantages that offer a ‘value proposition’ to end 
users, for example customers, which is more attractive than that of the competition. Such 
advantages are bound to involve innovation of one type or another, in the sense that any   33 
new ‘value proposition’ by definition involves something new (innovation), be this real or 
even ‘imaginatory’. This link between firms and value creation is even more pronounced if 
it is suggested that efficiency (from the division of labour, transaction costs, reductions of 
capability-related  productivity  advantages)  is  the  key  reason  for  their  existence  (see 
Loasby, 1998 for a discussion). 
 
Firms hope that such innovations will confer to them at least transient monopoly rents, but 
this cannot be guaranteed because of Schumpeterian competition. This renders crucial for 
firms to develop and leverage capabilities to learn, adapt, appreciate and enhance their 
‘productive-opportunity’  (the  dynamic  interaction  between  their  internal  resources  and 
capabilities, and their external environment - Penrose 1959), see Foss and Loasby (1998). 
 
There are no easy ways to achieve the above, but one possible approach to deal with the 
issue of value capture in an uncertain evolving environment proposed by Penrose (1959), is 
for firms to try to build relatively impregnable bases, namely a package of characteristics, 
skills, competences, innovation and capabilities that distinguish them from every other firm 
(see also Richardson, 1998, on firms’ distinct identity) and allows them to simultaneously 
build on strength and adapt. 
 
In Penrose’s words: 
 ‘In the long run the profitability, survival, and growth of a firm does not depend so 
much on the efficiency with which it is able to organize the production of even a 
widely diversified range of products as it does on the ability of the firm to establish   34 
one or more wide and relatively impregnable ‘bases’ from which it can adapt and 
extend it operations in an uncertain, changing and competitive world’ (p. 137 – 
emphasis added). 
 
Penrose’s concept of  ‘relatively impregnable bases’ is akin to more recent developments 
by  Teece  (1986),  and  the  RBV  pertaining  to  firm  heterogeneity,  the  need  for 
complementary assets and capabilities and the role of  dynamic capabilities in allowing 
firms  to  sustain  their  CAs  (Teece  2007).‘Relatively  impregnable  bases’,  and  ‘routines’ 
(Nelson and Winter 1982) can be seen as mechanisms through which firms try to marry 
over time stability and change, diversity and direction, equilibrium and growth, see Loasby 
(1996), Richardson (2002) and Pitelis (2002). 
 
In the above context, value capture and value creation co-evolve and are co-determined. 
‘Relatively impregnable bases’ allow firms to capture value, but also to create value by 
building on such bases. Strategies that allow firms to capture value, also help them to 
survive and thus create value. That explains why firm strategy is both value creating and a 
means of value capture.  
 
Clearly, some firms can be ‘too successful’ in building  ‘impregnable bases’. Companies 
like  Google  and  Microsoft  are  certainly  accused  for  failing  to  innovate,  because  their  
‘impregnability’ is strong enough for them to stem the forces of creative destruction. This is 
when SCA can undermine national value creation - this requires extra-firm governance to 
which we return in the next section.   35 
 
While value creation and capture co-evolve and are codetermined over time, at any given 
point in time, resources spent in pursuing value capture, may be taken away from resources 
required for value creation (for example innovation), see Mizik and Jacobson (2003). It is 
also arguable that the pursuit of value creation versus value capture may require different 
types of knowledge and capabilities (Loasby 1998). This helps explain why some firms 
(but  also  individuals  or  nations)  are  more  successful  in  creating  value,  some  others  in 
capturing value. Arguably, the successful management of this trade-off is of the essence of 
firm strategy and performance. Too much focus on value capture today may undermine 
long-term success, too much focus on value creation may deprive a company from the 
means to survive, thus the means of creating value.
1 This is an issue of concern to the 
society as a whole. 
 
We can highlight some of the issues covered in this Section by looking at the case of EMI 
and the CT scanner, discussed in more detail by Bartlett (2005) and Teece (1986). When 
EMI (a music company with cash available due to its success in the music sector devoted to 
develop innovations of potential use to its current and potentially other activities) invented 
the technology for the CT scanner, it could see its value creating and capturing potential 
through its applicability to a different (medical equipment) sector. EMI could try to capture 
value by licensing the technology, through a joint-venture or by entering the new sector. In 
the last mentioned case, it could do so within its home-base (the UK) or internationally, by 
undertaking foreign operations. In the last case it could enter a foreign market through 
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greenfield  investments  or  through  acquisitions.  The  decision  of  EMI  was  to  enter  the 
medical  equipment  sector  in  the  US,  where  demand  projections  were  best,  through 
greenfield foreign direct investment (fdi). Many scholars suggested that EMI had better 
pursue other strategies, given that it did not have complementary assets and capabilities in 
the new sector (Teece 1986). Seen differently there were competitors in the US market with 
relatively ‘impregnable bases’ such as distribution and brands, which they leveraged to 
eventually outcompete EMI. EMI’s failure to capture more value from its value creating 
advantage could have been foreseen and EMI could have adopted a different route, which 
might  include  building  complementary  assets  and  capabilities  before  entering  the  US 
market. This might allow EMI to create  a ‘relatively impregnable base’ which could help it 
compete in a more level-playing field with established players. Other possibilities for EMI 
could involve licensing, joint venture or entry through acquisition. 
 
EMI  rejected  licensing  or  joint  venture  because  of  fears  that  its  technology  would  be 
expropriated and/or because of uncertainty over demands, which would imply potentially 
unsatisfactory royalties or terms with a partner, see Bartlett (2005). In this context going it 
alone would appear to be a good choice. Given this decision, the building of a relatively 
‘impregnable bases’ could be a very lengthy process. One way to speed-up the process 
would be for EMI to acquire a player in the US market. This, for example, is how Kodak 
managed  to  acquire  digital  photography  capabilities  successfully,  see  Grant  (2005). 
However, this presupposed the existence or acquisition targets and problems associated 
with  a  merger  that  lead  to  the  usual  claims  about  the  ‘unprofitability  of  mergers’  (see 
Scherer and Ross 1990). The point here is that, given uncertainty about future demands,   37 
potential market failures associated with licensing and joint ventures, and the difficulties of 
establishing complementary capabilities, either its own, or through acquisitions (especially 
lacking experience in so doing), what EMI did might look like the best strategy for it on the 
basis of the information it possessed at the time. Such difficulties to adopt a theoretically 
optimal strategy are likely to be more severe for smaller firms, especially in the absence of 
a strong ‘appropriability regime’ supported by patents, see Teece (1986, 2006). The best 
possible strategy may also depend on the sector under consideration, see Gans et al. (2001), 
Gans and Stern (2003) and the existence or otherwise, of market for ideas, see Arora et al 
(2001). 
 
Had  EMI  possessed  some  transferable  advantages  to  a  target  and/or  experience  with 
acquisitions, acquiring a US player, if available might have proven a better choice. For 
example, CEMEX’s acquisitions transfer skills and competencies in distribution and IT to 
the acquired target in the same sector. In so doing, CEMEX adds value, but also leverages 
‘reverse knowledge capability-transfer’, when acquisition firms have such knowledge like 
in the case of the UK RMC Group, that CEMEX acquired, which had complementary 
knowledge to CEMEX in ready-made cement. This strategy helps CEMEX influence the 
industry structure, acquire market power, and create a relatively impregnable bases, all at 
the same time, see Nelson (1995). In the process CEMEX also acquires knowledge for 
doing this better next time around. In addition, CEMEX decides not just on the basis of 
extant  knowledge,  but  on  the  basis  of  anticipated  change  in  its  local  (Mexico)  and 
international markets. Once decisions have been made, moreover, it also acts to influence 
the external environment, in a way that it is consistent with its decided upon strategy (see   38 
Hill 2006; Pitelis 2007a). In all, what we have here is decision making under conditions of 
uncertainty on the basis of anticipatory change, through adaptive and proactive behaviour 
that aim to influence the firms’ ‘productive opportunity’. Value creation and capture in this 
context,  as  well  as  their  determinants,  are  co-evolving,  co-determined  and  influence 
perennial learning, adaptation and proactive behaviour. The very factors that help create 
value (transfer of skills) helps CEMEX capture value, through increased efficiency, market 
power and a relatively more ‘impregnable bases’. 
 
To summarize, in the real world of uncertainty, change, limited rationality and learning, 
adaptative and proactive behaviour based on anticipatory change,  and attempts to mould 
their  ‘productive opportunity’, is the way through firms try to survive, evolve and succeed. 
A way to effect this is by aiming to build relatively impregnable albeit evolving bases, on 
which to build on strength, and adapt in a partly endogenous, changing environment. In this 
context, value creation and value capture are co-determined and co-evolving. 
 
Despite such fluidity, the possibility that some firms or nations will be ‘too successful’ and  
compete in ways insidious to the world-wide value creation process is ever present. This 
calls for suitable policies by firms, governments and extra-private-extra-public actors, such 
as NGOs, to help align different interests by actors and address time-inconsistency and 
other  problems,  in  a  way  that  safeguards  the  process  of  sustainable  world-wide  value 
creation. 
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IV. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
To summarize and conclude, we claimed that: 
•  capturing value from value creating advantages such as innovation is an important 
objective  of business strategy. 
o  innovation  is  not  the  only  source  of  value  creation.  Firms  may  wish  to 
capture value from other value creating capabilities, advantages or just ideas 
o  strategy may be a sufficient condition for value capture, even in the absence 
of innovation. Strategy itself is a firm advantage-value creator, from which 
value can be captured. Firms use a panoply of specific strategies to capture 
value, all of which also contribute to varying degrees to value creation. 
o  many value capture strategies may be unavailable to some firms, especially 
when they lack ‘track-record’, and relatively ‘impregnable bases’. 
•  the successful capture of value by (especially large) firms, need not be beneficial for 
the economy as a whole, for example if it  thwarts innovation. 
•  public policies to capture value for a nation may thwart the process of sustainable 
world-wide value creation, when they hinder knowledge transfer, learning and innovation. 
Neo-protectionist  policies  by  developed  nations  are  likely  to  have  such  effects.  The 
imposition of sectional interests on other societal interests can have similar effects, as in the 
case of IMF-World Bank advise in the case of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
•  our  focus  on  the  sustainability  of  world-wide  value  creation,  alongside  our 
framework on value creation and capture helps fill important gaps in the literature, and   40 
points to  the  need  for innovative  and  mutually  consistent and  reinforcing  business  and 
public policies. 
 
•  in reality, under uncertainty, change and limited rationality, value capture and value 
creation are co-determined and co-evolving. Decisions are taken by firms on the basis of 
extant limited knowledge, but also anticipatory change: firms behave in an adaptive, but 
also proactive way that aims to enhance their ‘productive opportunity’, learning is crucial 
for success. 
 
•  learning and co-evolution do not preclude the possibility that success will lead to 
embedded power structures, which could be used in ways insidious to the wider aim of 
overall value creation. This calls for appropriate ‘governance’. 
 
What constitutes appropriate governance, or more appropriately ‘sustainability-compatible 
governance’ is a thorny issue, beyond the scope of this paper. Pitelis (2007b) and Mahoney 
et  al.  (2008),  among  others,  have  more  extensive  discussions.  However,  the  following 
implications follow from our analysis, so far, concerning managerial practice, public policy 
and overall national and global governance. 
 
First,  firms  should  aim  to  compete  in  an  enlightened  way,  that  takes  into  account  the 
potential negative externalities of their actions, which may prejudice the sustainability of 
system-wide value creation, and also eventually their own success. At the most basic level,   41 
this implies competing through innovation, the avoidance of restrictive and monopolistic 
practices. 
 
Public policy should aim to enhance competition through innovation (see Teubal 2002, 
Metcalfe,  2003,  Pitelis,  2003),  by  regulating  anti-competitive  and  promoting  new  firm 
creation and growth and markets for technology and ideas, see Arora et al (2001). Nation 
states (especially developed ones) should avoid ‘strategic trade policies’ and/or the pursuit 
of sectoral interests of powerful groups, at the expense of the wider interest of economic 
sustainability. Pluralism and diversity, through the creation and growth of NGOs, consumer 
associations, public-private partnerships, clusters and overall ‘social capital’ creation (see 
Moran and Ghoshal 1999; Putnam, 1993, Pitelis 2004) should be encouraged, in order to 
ensure a degree of mutual stewardship and monitoring that aims to address the problem of 
‘who monitors the monitor’ (Alchian and Demsetz 1972), which in practical terms means 
the avoidance of  ‘regulatory capture’ by powerful constituents in pursuit of rent-seeking 
(Stigler 1971; Olson 1971; Krueger 1974). 
 
Setting-up  an  accountable  international  organization  that  places  ‘sustainability’  at  the 
centre-stage of its Agenda, could be another way of addressing the problem of ‘regulatory 
capture’. Such organizations can also be captured by organised interests, see Stiglitz (2007) 
for the case of the World Bank and the IMF. Other organizations, such as the WTO, may 
confer benefits to developing nations, but can also be captured by more powerful nations, 
see Ramamurti (2004). The potential accountability deficit is a crucial issue that needs to be 
addressed.   42 
 
Enlightened managerial practice, national and inter-national regulation, and innovation and 
value-creation-promoting  policies,  as  well  as  diversity  and  pluralism  and  accountable 
global  governance,  may  go  some  way  towards  advancing  the  ‘global  social  good’  of 
sustainable  world-wide  value  creation.  They  are  unlikely  to  suffice.  Embedded  power 
structures are likely to try to make this hard to realise. However, sustainability may well be 
a target that helps us focus on the laudable objective of unleashing global resources and 
capabilities for the promotion of the wider good, which is sustainable global value creation, 
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